Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) is a common practice in organizations.
Comparisons among the performances of di¤erent agents who are assigned to similar tasks are sometimes explicitly contained in labor contracts. Sellers'compensations usually depend on the level of sales relative to the achievements of other sellers; CEOs compensations may contain a bonus based on a comparison with competitors'returns. In other cases, even in the absence of explicit contract clauses, compensations implicitly depend on the results of peers working in similar conditions. Informal comparisons among workers are crucial both when …rms set internal performance standards and when hierarchical superiors evaluate their subordinates.
Agency theory (Holmström, 1982; Mookherjee, 1984) has provided a rationale for these practices in terms of their informational content. When agents' outcomes are subject to a common element of uncertainty, the output of each individual acts both as a signal of his own performance and as a signal of the realizations of the common uncertain parameter. As a consequence, comparisons of agents'performances are valuable because they bring additional pieces of information to the system. This has important consequences also for the design of both jobs and accounting systems. Duplication of tasks or job rotation may be of value to the …rm as well as the de…nition of comparable pro…t/cost centers precisely because they allow relative evaluation.
Here we consider a …rm producing a single good in two plants located in geographically di¤erent areas. Each plant faces identical costs but serves a di¤erent market whose stochastic demand is positively related to that of the other market. Such a positive relation might represent common macro factors that add to idiosyncratic demand components. These market conditions are re ‡ected in stochastic and positively dependent returns to the (unobservable) e¤ort of each plant's director. We investigate the form of the compensation schedules that the owner of the …rm (the principal) should o¤er to directors (the agents) in order to motivate them to exert the optimal level of e¤ort. Given that returns are stochastically dependent, we expect that optimal compensation schedules will be interdependent. In particular we want to investigate the sign of such interdependence and to determine conditions that ensure monotonically negative relation between the compensation of one director and the performance of his colleague.
Although the informational relevance of relative performance evaluation has been stressed in the literature 1 , the model with one principal and many agents 1 Following the theoretical results of Holmström (1982) and Mookherjee (1984) there have also been several attempts to verify the empirical relevance of relative performance evaluation in CEO compensations. This literature has focussed on the implicit (supposedly negative) relation between total CEO pay and market/sector performance. Results are mixed. Antle and Smith (1986) and Janakiraman Lambert and Larcker (1992), performing longitudinal analyses, conclude that evidence is only weakly consistent with RPE. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) , analysing pooled cross-sectional time series, …nd a negative and signi…cant relation between changes in CEO compensations and both market and industry performance. Recently, Kren (2002) has veri…ed that the use of relative performance evaluation is related to the level 1 has not been completely characterized. First of all, the applicability of the …rst-order approach (i.e. of the procedure that substitutes incentive compatibility constraints with their …rst-order conditions) has not been investigated. Extensions of the monotone likelihood (MLR) and of the convexity of the distribution function (CDF) conditions that ensure the validity of the …rst-order approach in the single agent case (Mirrlees, 1979; Rogerson, 1985) have only been established for the general multi-signal case (Sinclair-Desgagné, 1994). Our multi-agent model can be considered part of the class of multi-signal models but has some speci…cities. In multi-signal models, several signals are observed concerning a single level of e¤ort. In our model, with many agents and separable production functions, each agent's output is a signal both of that agent's e¤ort and of the realization of the random variables a¤ecting the output of other agents. However it is not a direct signal of their e¤orts. Due to this peculiarity, the extension of the …rst-order approach is somewhat simpli…ed. Secondly, the form of the dependence of an individual's compensation on others'performance has not been thoroughly studied. Holmström and Milgrom (1990) analyze the form of optimal compensations in a linear model with normally distributed random variables and exponential utility functions. They show that positive (negative) correlation implies negative (positive) dependence of the compensation of one agent on the performance of his co-workers. No analogous result, however, has been proved in more general settings.
After presenting the model (section 2), we investigate the question of the validity of the …rst-order approach in our multi-agent setting (section 3). We show that the extensions of the MLR and CDF conditions take a slightly di¤er-ent form and that fewer assumptions are needed than in the general multi-signal model. We then point out (section 4) that a¢ liation of the random variables a¤ecting the directors'outcomes is both necessary and su¢ cient for the salary of each director to be nonincreasing in the performance of his colleague. We thus show that positive dependence of the random variables implies negative dependence of individual compensations on the results of the other agents. Section 5 concludes.
The model
Consider a …rm consisting of two plants, A and B; each run by a di¤erent director (agent). The two plants belong to the same owner (principal) and produce the same good which is sold in geographically separate but stochastically dependent markets. The monetary outcome of each plant x i is a function of the unobservable e¤ort of director i, a i ; and of the random variable i representing market conditions and all other factors that a¤ect x i and that are not controlled by director i.
R. The range of x i ; X = (x i ; x i ) ; is invariant with respect to a i . Moreover we assume that the outcome is increasing in both the diof common uncertainty thus providing a closer test of agency theory. 2 rector's e¤ort, @x i @a i > 0; and in the realization of the random variable,
The e¤ect of i on the marginal product is also (weakly) positive
As a consequence the inverse functions x 1 i (a i ; x i ) are well de…ned at each a i 2 A i with derivatives: @x
0: Let x, a; and denote vectors of outcomes, e¤orts and random variables respectively. The i have joint density g( ) and are a¢ liated dependent random variables. A¢ liation, which is discussed extensively in section 4, is meant to capture the positive dependence between market conditions faced by the two plants. The realizations of are not observable but g( ) is common knowledge. Since Mirrlees (1974) , it has become common practice to analyze such an agency problem by suppressing the i and considering the outcomes x i directly as random variables parametrized by the e¤ort levels a i : We will follow this approach but we will keep in mind the original setting since it is crucial for the proof of our result. Let then f (x; a) be the joint density function obtained as a transformation of g( ) via the functions x i ; i.e. f (x; a)=g(x 1 ) @x
The directors have additively separable utility functions over income and e¤ort, u i (y i ) c i (a i ); with u i concave and continuously di¤erentiable and c i convex and twice continuously di¤erentiable. The monetary outcome x i accrues to the risk neutral owner who has to compensate director i with, possibly contingent, salary y i (x): The owner wants to maximize his expected pro…t, given that the agents choose the e¤ort levels so as to maximize their expected utility, and that they receive at least their reservation level of utility U i : In other terms, the owner has to solve:
subject to:
Note that incentive compatibility constraints (3) impose that a i be a Nash equilibrium of the game played by the directors. In other words we are assuming that the agents act non cooperatively, i.e. that they do not engage in collusive behavior. This seems reasonable in the present context where directors do not observe each other's e¤ort which makes the striking and enforcing of a covert contingent side contract quite problematic.
A …rst-order approach formulation of the problem
Under the …rst-order approach, incentive compatibility constraints (3) are replaced by their …rst-order conditions. However, to be allowed to do so, we need to ensure that the expected utility of the agents are concave in a i . It is well known that in the standard single agent case the validity of the …rst-order approach is guaranteed by the monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) together with the convexity of the distribution function (CDF) assumptions 3 . We will now provide extensions of these assumptions for our two-agent case.
Note that, if substituted by its …rst-order conditions, (3) becomes:
Solving (1) subject to (2) and (4), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions on y i (x) give:
where i and i are the multipliers associated with participation and incentive compatibility constraints (2) and (4) respectively. This form is particularly convenient in that it directly relates the shape of the compensation schedule y i (x) to the shape of the ratio f ai (x; a) f (x; a) :
In order to justify this procedure let us …rst make the following assumption:
Partial monotone likelihood ratio condition (PMLRC):
is nondecreasing in x i for a + i a i ; i; k = A; B; i 6 = k:
PMLRC means that a higher x i is a better signal for a higher a i , at each (x k ; a k ) ; i.e. that it is more likely to have a higher x i if a i is large independently of what the other director has done. This seems the natural extension of the MLR condition of the single agent case to our multi-agent setting: we simply assume that MLR holds at any given couple (x k ; a k ): The form of such extension marks a …rst di¤erence from the general multi-signal model in which (contrary to our case where, given a k ; x k is a signal on i and not on a i ) there is an entire vector of signals correlated to the e¤ort of one agent and where the MLR condition is then de…ned with respect to the entire vector (Sinclair-Desgagné, 1994).
Lemma 1: PMLRC implies that f ai (x; a) f (x; a) is non decreasing in x i , i = A; B:
Proof : The proof follows exactly the proof given in Milgrom's (1981) Proposition 5 for the single agent case.
This together with (5) ; in turn implies
Lemma 2: PMLRC implies i > 0 and is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for y i (x) to be nondecreasing in x i :
Proof: The proof follows the standard argument of the corresponding proof for the single agent case.
This is just a straightforward extension of a well-known result in single agent literature. To ensure a positive relation between the compensation of a director and his own outcome we have to assume monotonicity of the likelihood ratio.
PMLRC, however, is not su¢ cient to ensure the validity of the …rst-order approach. In order to be able to extend also the CDF condition, let us then de…ne
, the cumulative distribution of x i at x k and a k : We can then use an argument similar to that of Milgrom's (1981) Proposition 1 to prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 3: From PMLRC it follows that H i x i ; x k ; a 
Integrating the above expression over x i x i yields:
Since y i (x) is nondecreasing in x i this implies that the expected utility of director i; R u i (y i (x)) f (x; a)dx; is increasing in a i : To ensure that it does so at a decreasing rate we also make the following assumption.
Partial convexity of the distribution function condition (PCDFC):
We are then in a position to prove: Proposition 1. Under PMLRC and PCDFC agent i's expected utility is concave in a i .
Proof.
Integrating R u i (y i (x)) f (x; a)dx by parts with respect to x i ; we obtain:
The …rst term is a sum of constants with respect to a i while the second one is the sum of terms that are convex in a i multiplied by positive terms. Since c i (a i ) is convex; the expected utility of agent i is concave in a i :
Therefore the …rst-order approach is valid and (5) gives the optimal compensation y i (x): Our line of proof has paralleled that of the multi-signal model of Sinclair-Desgagné (1994). Note however that Lemma 3 is not valid in that context where the MLR condition is de…ned with respect to a vector of signals on the e¤ort of one agent. This is the reason why Sinclair-Desgagné has to assume stochastic dominance of the cumulative distribution function of one signal.
Optimal compensations
From lemma 2, we know that the compensation y i (x) of director i is nondecreasing in his own outcome x i : Moreover, since the i are not independent, we know (from Holmström, 1982 ) that y i (x) also depends on director k's result, x k :
4 We do not know anything, however, about the sign of such relation. The incentive content of the positive link between director i's compensation and his own level of output is obvious: director i will be motivated to exert a high level of e¤ort in e¢ ciently producing and selling the good. Note, however, the relevance of the MLR assumption for this result. Due to the informational content of level of outcome, in the absence of the MLR assumption, i's optimal compensation need not be monotonically increasing in i's own outcome. For example, the distribution of x i could be such that, up to a given level of outcome b x i ; a higher x i signals a high level of e¤ort, while for x i b x i ; the level of outcome is related to high realizations of the random variable representing market conditions, independently of the e¤ort exerted. In that case, for any give x k , the optimal y i would be increasing up to b x i and decreasing at b x i : Something similar might happen in the relationship between the optimal compensation of director i and the outcome of director k (depending on the form of the joint distribution of x i and x k ), if relatively higher levels of x k were to signal relatively higher values of i up to b x k but relatively lower values of i for x k b x k : For any given x i , director i's compensation would …rst decrease and then increase in x k : Since we want to represent a situation in which there is positive stochastic dependence between the market conditions faced by the two directors, we want y i (x) to be monotonic in x k . We now show that a¢ liation is the appropriate assumption to rule out non monotonicity.
Formally, a bivariate random variable = ( i ; k ) is said to be a¢ liated (Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Tong, 1980) if:
A¢ liation broadly means that the random variables tend to move together, i.e. that it is more likely to have a high realization of i when there is a high rather than a low realization of k . It is thus a form of positive dependence.
5
Proposition 2: A¢ liation between the i i = A; B; is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the compensation of director i, y i (x) to be a nonincreasing function of the outcome of director k; x k ; i; k = A; B; i 6 = k.
Proof : Consider (5) for agent i. We can write:
where @x
Note that for any
Therefore (7) holds if and only if
is nondecreasing in k which is in turn necessary and su¢ cient for
Each director should be then compensated in direct relation to his own outcome and in negative relation to the performance of the director of the other plant. Given that the random variables a¤ecting the two outcomes are a¢ liated, the result of director k is used as a signal of the realization of the random variable a¤ecting i 0 s output. Since a high realization of x k (given a k ) signals a high realization of k and since a¢ liation implies that a high k is likely to be associated to a high i ; a high level of x k can be interpreted as a signal of a relatively high i : This speaks in favor of luck, in the sense of exogenously good market conditions, for director i and for this reason the latter should be paid less (for any given level of x i ), the higher is x k : As pointed out by Holmström (1982) and Mookherjee (1984) , whenever outputs are dependent, relative performance evaluation allows to …lter out the common element of uncertainty and thus to improve upon independent compensations. These authors however do not fully characterize the compensation schedule y i (x). As it happens for the relation of i 0 s compensation to x i in the absence of the MLR assumption, the relation of y i (x) to x k could in principle take any form. A¢ liation ensures that the compensation of an agent is monotonically nonincreasing in the performance of his peer.
Concluding remarks
We have studied the form of optimal incentives for the directors of two plants belonging to the same owner and selling the same good on geographically differentiated markets. If the demands on the two markets are stochastically dependent, the performance of one director gives some information about the realization of the random variable a¤ecting the outcome of his colleague. This principal multi-agent model can thus be regarded as a kind of multi-signal model. We have shown, however, that fewer assumptions are needed than in the general multi-signal model (Sinclair-Desgagné, 1994) in order to provide appropriate extensions of the MLR and CDF conditions that justify the …rst-order approach in the single agent case. We have then investigated the viability of relative performance evaluation and we have shown that the compensation of one director is monotonically nonincreasing in the performance of the other if and only if the random variables are a¢ liated.
Clearly our results apply to other principal multi-agent settings. We could have considered compensation schedules of sellers working for the same …rm or also those of CEOs of di¤erent …rms as long as the outcome of each individual is known to all concerned. Alternatively, we could also have considered di¤erent workers or pro…t/cost centers inside a single …rm. Whenever the uncertainty a¤ecting the outcomes of di¤erent units or individuals can be represented by a¢ liated random variables, the optimal compensation of each unit/individual is a monotonically negative function of the performance of the others. What is crucial to our result is that separable signals of the performance of di¤erent agents are available so that, given the e¤ort of an agent, his outcome can be interpreted as a signal of the random variable a¤ecting his production. In our case this is guaranteed by separability of production functions. In general, production externalities or team production could also be considered as long as either a signal of each agent's performance is observable or the externalities are su¢ ciently small.
